The writer taught political science at Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, and is chief editor of 'Studies in Indian Politics'.
Good, Bad, Ugly
Moments like Pulwama hold up a mirror to the government, media and nation.
Diplomats have to be wordsmiths. So, when the foreign secretary of India used the phrases “non-military” “preemptive strikes”, they were, though clever, hardly surprising. Yet, there was something good about it.
Besides the clever phraseology, the air strikes and official statement by the government implied a twin assertion. First, that India would want to be seen as strongly responding to Pulwama going beyond the traditional restraint for which the Indian establishment is known. In terms of domestic politics, the dividend derived from such an assertion is quite obvious. At the same time, and beyond domestic politics, this assertion also sought to intimate to the international community a possible shift if Pakistan cannot be reined in by diplomatic measures.
But the official statement also sought to define the expected boundaries of this shift — that India does not want the situation to escalate into a military confrontation which, in any case, was a pre-destined miscalculation known to the MEA establishment. Any episode such as Pulwama could never turn into anything except tragic and hurtful. Whether to turn this also into a journey through a dark tunnel was the only moot question. With Balakot, India chose to opt for that journey. Immediately after the air strike, it appeared that in spite of the darkness the journey may involve, the flickering light of diplomacy (towards the world outside) and statesmanship (towards attempts to convert the moment into uncontrollable jingoism) may save the day.
The immediate aftermath of Pulwama and the airstrikes had yet another silver lining. In spite of the innuendoes from official circles about “security failures” by previous governments, the Opposition chose to respond much more responsibly than was expected, given its bitter relationship with the government. So much so, that serious questions about Pulwama, too, were brushed under the carpet.
Opposition parties correctly assessed that instead of creating a nationalist backlash, such issues may be deferred for purposes of both national interest and political prudence. Similarly, the official position and Opposition response right after the airstrikes were subdued. It could be said that both responses were mainly dictated by compulsions of the circumstances. The government’s response was circumscribed by the possible international fallout while the response by the Opposition was subdued by fear of political calculations. It looked like the journey through the dark tunnel could be quickly over. So far so good.
But the restraint shown by most Opposition parties was not reflected — even less reciprocated — in the reactions from circles “close to the establishment”. While the GoI response for international consumption had all the trappings of cunning and self-restraint, the ruling party and its friends were unable to resist the temptation to use the dark tunnel to their partisan and ideological advantage.
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