viernes, 22 de febrero de 2019

Cloud over economic data invites questions about government’s sincerity | The Indian Express

Cloud over economic data invites questions about government’s sincerity | The Indian Express



Cloud over economic data invites questions about government’s sincerity

There seems to be a systematic pattern in distorting and/or withholding public information that could throw a harsh light on the government’s performance. This is the time for all democratically-minded people to raise their voice against the tendency.

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India was a pioneer in nurturing such a statistical system. As Angus Deaton, the Noble laureate, and Valerie Kozel said, “Where Mahalanobis and India led, the rest of the world followed”.
Economic statistics have a public good character — their use is non-rival and non-excludable. Such information is necessary for evidence-based policymaking and informed discussion in democracies where citizens seek accountability from their government. The use of scientific methods for collection and estimation and their timely dissemination are, therefore, public services. Universally, publicly-funded institutions with professional independence and external oversight perform these functions to insulate them from political interference. India was a pioneer in nurturing such a statistical system. As Angus Deaton, the Noble laureate, and Valerie Kozel said, “Where Mahalanobis and India led, the rest of the world followed”.
Lately, Indian statistics have come under a cloud. In early 2015, the Central Statistical Office (CSO) issued a new GDP series (with the revised base year 2011-12), which showed a significantly faster growth rate for 2011-12 to 2013-14 compared the earlier series (with base-year 2004-05). Manufacturing sector growth rate for 2013-14, for instance, simply ballooned — swinging from (-) 1.4 per cent in the old series to (+) 5.5 per cent in the revised one. Data users sought the CSO’s explanation as the revised estimates did not square with related macro-aggregated data such as bank credit growth or industrial capacity utilisation. Dismissing such criticisms, the CSO asserted that the revision was in line with the global best practices — following the UN System of National Accounts, 2008 — and used the Ministry of Corporate Affairs’s (MCA) much larger corporate database.
Since then, with almost every GDP revision, more worms tumbled out of the can. For instance, in the January 31 release, the GDP growth rate for 2016-17 — the year of demonetisation — was revised upwards by 1.1 percentage points to 8.2 per cent, the highest in a decade. This flies in the face of most evidence economists — most recently, Gita Gopinath, the IMF chief economist — have produced. How could such large counter-intuitive upward revisions happen? It is impossible to independently investigate the mystery, as the CSO has refused to reveal specific methodological details.
As mandated since 1950-51, with every base-year revision, the CSO has always published the back series within a few months of the publication of the new series. This time it took over three years, as the officials informally admitted their inability as MCA data for years prior to 2006 did not exist. Yet, last year, two competing back series of varying time lengths were prepared — separately by the National Statistical Commission and CSO— showing diametrically opposite growth rates. They seem coloured by political considerations, discrediting not only professional work but also damaging institutional integrity. The seeds of doubts about the GDP revision sown four years ago have grown into a banyan tree of distrust.
In another instance recently, the Department of Industrial Policy and Planning (DIPP) has stopped updating FDI inflow data. Its official web page was last updated a year ago, with figures available up to December 2017. Surprisingly, the government that has often invoked rising FDI inflow as evidence of its industrial policy success has turned silent. Why, one wonders.


Make in India’s success is claimed by showing the improved ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EDB) index — from 142 in 2014 to 78 in 2018. But as the improved ranking is shown to be an artifact of changed methodology, did it really accomplish a policy goal without an improved industrial performance?

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